Those critics who have analyzed V. and The Crying of Lot 49, for instance, have labeled them "novels," IInew romance,1I "romantic epic," or "black humor.1I This disagreement suggests that critics have been trying too hard to classify these works which do not fulfill traditional expectations.
I
Critics for the most part have avoided the writings of Thomas Pynchon. I suspect one reason for this is that present critical tools are inadequate for the purpose.
Those critics who have analyzed V. and The Crying of Lot 49, for instance, have labeled them "novels," IInew romance,1I "romantic epic," or "black humor.1I This disagreement suggests that critics have been trying too hard to classify these works which do not fulfill traditional expectations.
In other words, the abstraction categories such as "novel,"
IInew romance," "romantic epic," and "black humor" are constructs which identify elements in the books but which limit the critic's overall view of the books.
Two purposes have prompted this observation. First, I plan to approach Pynchon's "Entropy"l without attempting to apply traditional labels. As much as possible I intend to focus on how IIEntropyll works rather than on what it is.
The second purpose is more important. Classification based on abstraction is raised as an epistemological issue in "Entropy.1I This issue forms the basis for an exploration of two ontological approaches suggested by the two scientific concepts of entropy: thermodynamic entropy and entropy of information.
My main discussion will center on the relationship between the scientific concepts and the two strands of action in "Entropy.1I Viewed in this way, the conclusion of Pynchonts work 1s a choice presented to the reader, not a single vision of "culture sinking into an equilibrium of meaninglessness. ,,2
The problem of applying an abstract literary category becomes apparent from even a superficial examination of the work. Viewed as a short story, "Entropy" seems to be a failure. It contains three distinct settings, two seemingly unrelated plots, and little characterization. Only the overwhelming amount of precise detail suggests that this "short story" might be unified at a symbolic level.
The bare action occurs in three spatially distinct areas: in Callisto's apartment, in Meatball's apartment below Callisto's, and outside the two apartments. A surface examination of this action gives few clues as to its meaning. Outside, it is raining. Downstairs, Meatball is giving a lease-breaking party. Various people come and go, including Saul who has had a fight with his wife and the Duke di Angelis quartet which plays soundless music. The party becomes increasingly chaotic until Meatball can no longer tolerate the noise. He attempts to quiet the revelers; and the party dwindles. Upstairs, Callisto and Aubade spend their time recording his memoirs, attempting to cure a sick bird, and checking the outside temperature. When the bird dies and Aubade accepts the constant 37 0 temperature as decisive, she breaks the window of their hermetically-sealed apartment and together they await the heat-death of the universe.
Characterization, too, is minimal. Nowhere in the story can physical descriptions of the characters be found.
Meatball, the most fully developed character (in a Jamesian sense) is realized primarily by his behavior. He moves from group to group and carries on conversations. Only at the conclusion of "Entropy" are his thoughts portrayed.
The way he figured, there were only about two ways he could cope: (a) lock himself in the closet, or (b) try to calm everybody down, one by one (p. 291).
Meatball's thoughts center on coping with the immediate situation, not on comprehending it. His guests are similarly, but less extensively, developed. Upstairs, Callisto is realized by his limited behavior, his memoirs, and his reminiscences, all of which center on his obsession with classical thermodynamics. Aubade, his girl, is even more puzzling. From the outset she seems more an abstraction than a human being • . She was part French and part Annamese, and she lived on her own curious and lonely planet, where the clouds and the odor of poincianas, the bitterness of wine and the accidental fingers at the small of her back or feathery against her breasts came to her reduced inevitably to the terms of sound: of music which emerged at intervals from a howling darkness of discordancy (p. 280).
Callisto and Aubade are developed as "characters" whose ideas seem more important than their individuality. Thus, it should be apparent that depth of personality is not a concern in "Entropy." preciseness of detail. The first encounter with the Duke di Angelis quartet is a good example.
In the living room Duke, Vincent, Krinkles and Paco sat crouched over a 15-inch speaker which had been bolted into the top of a wastepaper basket listening to 27 watts' worth of The Heroes Gate at Kiev (p. 277).
---These details seem to be interwoven into intricate patterns centering primarily on various dimensions of weather and sound.
The importance of these details to the content and form of "Entropy" will be discussed in greater detail later.
At this pOint, however, some philosophical and scientific background seems necessary.
Science has often been considered more exact or precise than humanistic endeavors. Yet, even in SCience, the problem of classification based on abstraction is important.
Definition of atomic structure is a good illustration. Wave was originally a classification for impulses set up by a vibration; as such waves had no mass. Particle was a classfication for matter without magnitude, yet with characteristics attributable to mass: inertia and force of attraction.
Recently, physicists have discovered that what is called an atom exhibits characteristics both of waves and of particles.
To classify atoms as either waves or particles would be to ignore some of the vital characteristics of atomic structure; yet to classify atoms as "wavicles" would necessitate a com- Statistical ideas had been used in the nineteenthcentury physics, but then it was always assumed that the basic laws were completely deterministic. Statistical calculations were made when one lacked complete information or because of the complexity of the system involved. In the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics I have just described, however, randomness is not accepted purely for calculational purposes. It is a fundawental aspect of the basiC physical laws themselves.
Information theory is based on this new view of statistics. From the outset, information was defined statistically and operationally: it "is a function of the ratio of the number of possible answers before and after a specific problem is solved, and we choose a logarithmic law in order to insure additivity of the information contained in independent situations.,,5 It is easier for a non-
SCientist to understand what information is not. Information is not a "thing" which can be measured precisely;
instead it is the expression of a relationship. Information does not contain meaning or value; these are considerations beyond the scope of present scientific theory. Information is based entirely on unpredictability or deviation from a norm.
Entropy of information was defined by C. E. Shannon as the physical source of information. The term entropy was used because of the mathematical similarity between thermodynamic entropy (~) and information (£=_1).6 'Nhat is important to remember 1s that despite the mathematical similarity there is no physical connection between the two entropies. 7
The importance of this involved discussion is twofold. Outside there was rain. Rain splatted against the tar paper on the roof and was fractured into a fine spray off the noses, eyebrows and lips of the wooden gargoyles under the eaves and ran like drool down the windowpanes (p. 278).
The description becomes more abstract as it covers more time and experience.
The day before it had snowed and the day before that there had been winds of gale force and before that the sun had made the city glitter bright as April, though the calendar read early February (p. 278).
Yet, as the additional dimensions become more abstract, the original precision of the detail is qualified.
It is a curious season, this false spring. Somewhere in it are Lincoln's Birthday and the Chinese New Year and a forlornness in the streets because cherry blossoms are weeks away still and, as Sarah Vaughan has put it, spring will be a little late this year. Generally crowds like the one which would gather in the Old Heidelberg on weekday afternoons to drink Wurtzburger and to sing Lili Marlene (not to mention The Sweetheart of Sigma Chi) are inevitably and incorrigibly Romantic (p. 278).
By classifying the crowds singing Lili Marlene and The
Sweetheart of Sigma Chi as RomantiC, the narrator has deliberately emphasized a peripheral meaning of the philosophical concept (represented by Romanticism). This can be seen as irony; but more important, it emphasizes the impreCise, approximate nature of the abstraction_ The process is not accidental; for again a peripheral meaning of soul is used to shift the context.
And as every ~ood Romantic knows, the soul (spiritus, rauch, pneuma) is nothing, substantially but air; it is only natural that warpings in the atmosphere should be recapitulated in those who breathe it (p. 278).
The philosophical context of soul (Romanticism) is quickly shifted to a scientific context (air, which has little substance) and then to science fiction (with "warpings u ). By deliberately shifting contexts and abstraction levels, the narrator is demonstrating the dangers of such a shift.
(Essentially, the effect of the passage is to assert that changeful weather causes Romanticism.) The significance of this process is underlined by the realization of the weather's effect in an extended metaphor of Brownian motion.
So that over and above the public components--holidays, tourist attractions--there are private meanderings, linked to the climate as if this spell were a stretto passage in the yearJs.fugue; haphazard weather, aimless loves, unpredicted commitments: months one can easily spend in fugue, because oddly enough, later on, winds, rains, passions of February and March are never remembered in that City, it is as if they had never been (pp. 278-79).
The suggestion of Brownian motion in the passage ties the process of verbal abstraction to scientific abstraction.
Brownian motion occurs Simultaneously with and independently from an increase in thermodynamic entropy. Because this motion is random, it cannot be measured precisely. Brownian motion, then, is a major factor in necessitating the use of statistics, even in classical thermodynamics. Albert
Einstein summarized the shift in his paper on kinetic theory • • • • it will be shown that according to the molecular-kinetic theory of heat, bodies of microscopically visible Size, suspended in a liquid, will perform movements of such magnitude that they can easily be observed in a microscope on account of the molecular motions of heat. It is possible that the movements to be discussed here are identical with the so-called "Brownian molecular motion." • • • if the movement discussed here can actually be observed. .' • then classicalthermodynam1cs can no longer be looked on as applicable with precision to bodies even of dimensions distinguishable in a rn1croscope. 8
The subsequent confirmation of Einstein's findings reinforces the epistemological position taken by the narrator in ltEntropy."
Just as Brownian motion occurs simultaneously with and independently from an increase in thermodynamic entropy, the "private meanderings" are trover and above the public components." Like the random movement of molecules, the "private meanderings" are "Romantic" (individual), "aimless, n "haphazard," and nunpredicted." They occur "in fugue," not linked by a cause-effect relationship. Finally, the "winds, rains, passions • • • are never remembered • • • it is as if they had never been" because like Brownian motion, they eXist but have no effect.
The precision with which the final statement is realized contrasts with the deliberate misuse of abstraction earlier to point to the approximation characteristic of abstraction.
It seems to me that through his deliberate emphasis on the incompleteness in abstraction in some passages and his attention to precise detail in others, the narrator is raising--and answering--the epistemological question inherent in any process of abstraction: how do we know what we know?
His process of metaphorical development seems to indicate that we know what we know first, from physical sensations which arise from isolated "facts" (such as the rain) and second, from that process of abstraction which is applied to these "facts."
This process of abstraction is consistently an approximation which mayor may not include certain significant characteristics of the "fact."
Finally, the use of weather in the passage indicates a possible explanation for the epigraph. In the passage the weather is a "given," a fact, to which significance is attributed by the narrator. This significance is realized in terms of sound; and the relationship between the humans and the weather is characterized as "in fugue." (The sound metaphors are related to ontological issues, as I will demonstrate later.) The use of "fugue" suggests the unity of experience and, by extension, the artificiality of abstraction. ThUS, the weather represents an epistemological given (discussed earlier). The epigraph, a passage about weather, also functions as a "given."
Boris has just given me a summary of his views. He is a weather prophet. The weather will continue bad, he says. There will be more calamities, more death, more despair. Not the slightest indication of a change anywhere • • • We must get into step, a lockstep toward the prison of death. There is no escape.
The weather will not change.
-Tropic £f Cancer (p. 277) Thus, the epigraph establishes the finality of the epistemological "given." The weather, like the process of abstraction, will not change. Men can get into "a lockstep toward death" by refusing to "know" anything. However, man still has a choice of alternative uses of abstraction which will enable him to "known reality with various degrees of approximation.
In "Entropy" the narrator uses the method of abstraction he has established in the weather passage to undercut the assumptions of Callisto and Aubade. For example, their "paradise" is less than ideal.
Mingled with the sounds of the rain came the first tentative, querulous morning voices of the other birds, hidden in philodendrons 'and small fan palms: patches of scarlet, yellow, and blue laced through this Rousseau-like fantasy, this hothouse jungle it had taken him seven years to weave together. Hermetically sealed, it was a tiny enclave of regularity in the City's chaos, alien to the vagaries of the weather, of national politics, of any civil disorder. Through trial-and-error Callisto had perfected its ecological balance, with the help of the girl its artistic harmony, so that the swayings of its plant life, the stirrings of its birds and human inhabitants were all as integral as the rhythms of a perfectly-executed mobile! He and the girl could no longer, of course, be omitted from that sanctuary; they had become necessary to its unity. What they needed from outside was delivered. They did not go out (p. 279).
Callisto has created a paradise; but like human creations, the paradise has flaws. Even though it is realized through attention to sensory stimulation, it is also like a "perfectly-executed mobile" which delights but does not provide complete satisfaction. Ultimately, it depends on the outside for physical needs and for contact with "reality" (represented by the penetrating sounds and the weather).
Callisto's microcosm is an abstraction; and any abstraction depends on those very "things" from which it was created.
The success of Callisto's artistic creation depends on his being an ideal; unfortunately, he is fallible (the death of the bird is not caused by an absence of heat transfer and the constant 37 0 temperature is not the omen of impending universal heat-death).
In another passage, the narrator illustrates how
Aubade, too, abstracts from hlxman experience without considering alternative possibilities.
In the hothouse Aubade stood absently caressing the branches of a young mimosa, hearing a motif of saprising, the rough and unresolved anticipatory theme of those fragile ~ink blossoms which, it is said, insure fertility (p. 287).
Neither Aubade nor the reader can know that the tree will blossom and bear fruit until it actually happens. Other factors such as disease and adequate nourishment can affect the blossoming and fruition of a tree. By deliberately couching Aubade's experience in terms of qualified abstractions ("hearing a motif," "unresolved anticipatory theme") the narrator is again pointing to the imprecision and deception inherent in abstraction. But for three days now, despite the changeful weather, the mercury had stayed at 37 0 Farenheit. Leery at omens of apocalypse, Callisto shifted beneath the covers. His fingers pressed the bird more firmly, as if needing some pulsing or suffering assurance of an early break in the temperature (p. 280).
Unlike the Meatball view which focuses on change, unpredictability, and deception as qualities of the weather, Callisto sees the constant 37 0 temperature as an omen of apocalypse, which subsequently develops as a vision of the heat-death of the universe.
Ironically, it is Callisto who names his own method of abstracting while hoping to avoid it.
He was aware of the dangers of the reductive fallacy and, he hoped, strong enough not to drift into the graceful decadence of an enervated fatalism (p. 283).
Reductionism arises out of a Newtonian world view which assumes, among other things, that the universe is like a giant machine operating on consistent, ultimately comprehensible principles. Therefore, a construct of "reality" The alternative approach, represented by Meatball, is holism. This view assumes that experience of the universe and its physical manifestation are inseparable. As such, no absolute assumptions or schematization of "reality" can be made. When experimentation or experience necessitates some contact with this "reality," the "reality" is broken into the largest manageable pieces and is dealt with in terms of the relationships between the pieces rather than in terms of the pieces themselves. In science, this process is known as "systems theory;" and while it is a reductive process, it admits more than one possible explanation for phenomena because relations generalized in one system are not assumed to be applicable to different systems.
Meatball seems to have few preconceived ideas about reality. His preference for alcohol over drugs is based on practical reasons. "Washington is lousy with Feds" (p. 281).
In listening to Saul's problem, Meatball points to Saul's reductionism, "Maybe she thought you were acting like a cold, dehumanized sCientist type" (p. 285). "You're sort of, I don't know, expecting a lot from people" (p. 286).
Finally, Meatball pOints to the problem of ontology.
"Well, sure • • • you were using different words. By "human being" you meant something that you can look at like it was a computer. It helps you think better on the job or something. But Miriam meant something entirely--" (p. 286).
The same approach can be seen in Meatball's discussion with Duke about soundless music.
A horrified awareness was dawning on Meatball. "And the next logical extension," he said.
"Is to think everything," Duke announced with Simple dignity. "Roots, line, everything." Meatball looked at Duke, awed. "But," he said (p. 290).
Meatball's "But" indicates that from his own experience, soundless music won't work.
Finally, Meatball's approach to "reality" which avoids classification other than where it is verifiable by experience has one additional dimension. When he can no longer deal with "reality" as a whole (as when the noise and chaos of the party become unbearable and unmanageable),
Meatball resorts to what seems to be a "systems" approach.
So he decided to try and keep his lease-breaking party from deteriorating into total chaos: he gave wine to the sailors and separated the mura players; he introduced the fat government girl ~andor ROjas, who would keep her out of trouble; he helped the girl in the shower to dry off and get into bed; he had another talk with Saul; he called a repairman for the refrigerator, which someone had discovered was on the blink. This is what he did until nightfall, when most of the revellers had passed out and the party trembled on the threshold of its third day (pp. 291-92).
As the passage indicates, Meatball is less concerned with the nature of "reality" than he is with functioning within it. However limited his understanding of "reality" is, his approach is more accurate than Callisto's because he allows for alternative explanations.
Aubade has the most unusual approach to t'reali ty." Unlike Callisto and Meatball who emphasize human experience as a source for ideas of "reality," Aubade's approach is highly theoretical and second-hand. Not only do sensuous experiences reach her "reduced inevitably to the terms of sound" (as I noted earlier), but she is constantly forced to readjust her concept of "reality" to include new, previously unclassified phenomena.
Counterpointed against his words the girl heard the chatter of birds and fitful car honkings scattered along the wet morning and Earl Bostic's alto rising in occasional wild peaks through the floor. The architectonic purity of her world was constantly threatened by such hints of anarchy: gaps and excrescences and skew lines, and a shifting or tilting of planes to which she had continually to readjust lest the whole structure shiver into a disarray of discrete and meaningless signals (p. 283).
Aubade's reductionism, an obsession for order reduced to musical terms, is complete. The greater danger lies beyond her reliance on abstraction, for she depends entirely on Callisto for "feedback" (in this case referring to direct experience). She cannot point out fallacies in his thinking because she has accepted his assumptions. She has only the power to follow them to their logical conclusion.
I have demonstrated how the weather and sound images establish the epistemological and ontological dimensions of "Entropy.1t These dimensions, however, do not represent the complete theme. Instead, they function as hypotheses in an experiment designed to determine the human value of these ideas. For this theme, the hypotheses must be tested in terms of metaphorical and behavioral interactions.
It should be apparent that "Entropy" is a story of ideas rather than personalities and that these ideas are controlled by scientific and metaphorical concepts of entropy.
Entropy is an effective metaphor in that the two scientific concepts of entropy are physically unrelated and theoretically related.
The scientific paradox is realized in "Entropy" by the use of two apartments. These apartments roughly correspond to the two physically unrelated fields of thermodynamics and information theory. Callisto's apartment represents the world of thermodynamic entropy in which everything is slowly evolving toward sameness and equilibrium.
In Meatball's apartment, entropy of information dominates.
Here, value is placed on the new and the unpredictable. The process of receiving information without classifying it is confusing as well as disappointing like a "stretto passage in the year's fugue" (p. 279). Changing one's concept of "reality" to fit each "bit" of information as Aubade tries to do is equally defeating. The process results in continuous readjustment" lest the whole structure shiver into a disarray of discrete and meaningless signals" (p. 283).
Sensuous experience is dulled by this process. One "hears a motif of sap-rising" (p. 287) rather than feels the rough branches or smells the fragile pink blossoms of a mimosa tree. Ultimately, the process results in human exhaustion and in separation from human relationships.
She crawled into dreams each night with a sense of exhaustion, and a desperate resolve never to relax that vigilance. Even in the brief periods when Callisto made love to her, soaring above the bowing of taut nerves in haphazard double stops would be the one singing string of her determination (p. 283).
Reducing information to a single vision of "reality" .
Information is often ambiguous, as Krinkles's "put-on"
indicates.
"When Dave was in the army, just a private E-2, they sent him down to Oak Ridge on special duty. Something to do with the Manhattan Project. He was handling hot stuff one day and got an overdose of radiation. So now he's got to wear lead gloves all the time." She shook her head symp~thetically\ "What an awful break: for a piano player" tpp. These must be attributed by the humans who use it, and human ideas about "reality" are inevitably constructs.
Two suggestions for dealing with information can be found in "Entropy." The first is described by the narrator in the opening description of "outside."
There were a lot of American expatriates around Washington, D.C., who would talk • • • about how someday they were going to go over to Europe for real but right now it seemed they were working for the government. Everyone saw a fine irony in this. They would stage, for instance, polyglot parties where the newcomer was sort of ignored if he couldn't carryon simultaneous conversations in three or four languages. They would haunt Armenian delicatessens for weeks at a stretch and invite you over for bulghour and lamb in tiny kitchens whose walls were covered with bullfight posters. They would have affairs with sultry girls from Andalucia or the Midi who studied economics at Georgetown. Their Dome was a collegiate Rathskeller out on Wisconsin Avenue called the Old Heidelberg and they had to settle for cherry blossoms instead of lime trees when spring came, but in its lethargic way their life provided, as they said, kicks (pp. 277-78).
By opening oneself to the widest possible range of experience (like using the largest possible sample for a statistical base), one assures that his construct of "realityn is based on as close and as accurate information as possible.
At the same time, one must recognize the "fine irony" inherent in the discrepancy between information and that which it represents. Otherwise, one may become the unwitting victim of the ultimate cosmiC joke as the epigraph suggests and as Callisto is realized.
Once the basic epistemological assumption is accepted, a choice of alternative ontological approaches presents itself. Like Callisto, one can reduce experience to a construct of "reality;" like Aubade, one can continue to adjust' a construct of "reality" to experience; or like Meatball, one can avoid a single construct of "reality" as much as possible. In the terms of "Entropy" all ontological approaches have drawbacks; but Meatball's approach is most viable. Only Meatball's approach allows for a practical incorporation of new experience into a construct of "reality" because the approach allows for multiple explanations.
Only Meatball's assumptions and behavior are not ironically undercut by the narrator. At the end of the story, only
Meatball is shown to be capable of positive action.
To me this realization of Meatball indicates that while his approach is not a complete solution to the problems raised in "Entropy," it is the most positive choice of the three, from the narrator's point of view. The choice remains the reader's, however, since the events in "Entropy" occurred "back then" in early February of '57" (p. 277).
I!Entropy" raises additional issues which I have neither time nor space to treat. Let me suggest a few, however.
There is a strong indication that Callisto and Aubade, respectively, represent the reductionist tendencies of science and art, and that Saul and Duke, respectively, represent the non-reductionist hopes of sCience and art. "Entropy" does indicate, too, that Aubade has relied too heavily on Callisto for her ideas. Does this mean that Meatball (mankind) needs to see art and science in new ways? Does this also mean that art can't depend on science?
In addition, the story raises serious questions about the nature of metaphor. Is it possible that metaphor, constructed with multiple referents and an eye toward hypothesis, could be a greater source of !I truth" than reductionism or even systems analysis? Certainly, Pynchon, John Barth, and Kurt Vonnegut indicate this possibility.
"Entropy" seems to me to be significant in that viewed as an exploration, it suggests further possibilities for literature beyond codification of forms of meaninglessness.
Pynchon's more recent books seems to have their comic Footnotes IThomas Pynchon, "Entropy," The Kenyon Review, 22 (1960) , 277-93. Subsequent quotations from the story will be indicated solely by page number. 2Arthur Mizener, "The New Romance," The Southern Review, 8 (Winter, 1972) , 106-17. Mizener's article is the only one I have found that analyzes "Entropy." The article is an attempt to define "new romance" as exemplified by "Entropy" and by ~ Crying of Lot 49. His interpretation of "Entropyn is based primarily on the metaphorical dimensions developed within the story rather than on a clear understanding of the scientific concepts. Thus, some of his observations and his conclusion are faulty. I do not plan to refute his article directly. 7There is, however, a theoretical relationship which is illustrated by the problem of Maxwell's Demon. This is carefully discussed in Brillouin, BAlbert Einstein, Investigations on the Theory of Brownian Movement, ed. R. Furth (New YorkT'"'!. P. button, 1903) , cited in Bork, pp. 42-43.
